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Political Parties in the United States. By JAMES H. HOPKINS. New York : The Knickerbocker Press, 1900.

Political Parties in the United States, 1846-1861. By JESSE MACY, A.M., LL.D. New York : Macmillan, 1900. 12mo, pp. 333.

The Machine Abolished. By CHARLES C. P. CLARK, M.D. New York : The Knickerbocker Press, 1900. 12mo, pp. 196.

THE three works under review represent three distinct types of the political treatise. The first is written by an ex-Congressman, and laboriously recounts unrelated facts without the care of the scholar or the humor and insight of the practical politician. The second is an attempt to co-ordinate political theory and political history. The third differs from the others in that it has a creed to propagate and a revolution to advocate. This revolution involves the utilization of the natural and economical mechanism of the caucus and convention, and the elimination of the artificial features which make direct popular election a farce and the boss an autocrat.

The reviewer would not feel justified in giving the first book a place in this company, were it not that it comes highly recommended by a responsible publisher, and endorsed by the author and editor of the second book. The announcements of the book are calculated to give it an extensive publicity, coming as it does at a time of general interest in political treatises. There is, unfortunately, no thought within its 477 pages which cannot be found better expressed in several obsolete works, while its facts, tables, and reprints have been presented in current works more directly, more logically, and in a more literary and interesting and instructive manner.

In none of the works is the economic motive given due emphasis. In the first the tariff of Hamilton, Clay, and Buchanan, the acquisition of territory by Jefferson, Polk, and McKinley, the rise and fall of the United States bank, the wild-cat speculation of antebellum days, the struggle of Calhoun for the southern principle of state rights, are mere heads to be counted as incidents of party strife. The congressional caucus ceases, the national convention begins. Why the caucus gave way to the convention is not explained. There was a panic of 1837. Why there was a financial depression, why inflation was inevitable, why it repeated itself in 1857, does not appear. It is hardly expected that one would detect fundamental forces who could dispose of Henry George and his work in the economic history of

the nineteenth century by the statement : " He was a life-long democrat ; well known as an honest, consistent, and able friend of the working classes," whose political importance was due to a rôle in the three-cornered mayoralty fight in New York City.

The second author recognizes certain economic forces as having been periodically and spasmodically operative. It is disappointing, however, to see so little consideration given to industrial forces. Had the depressions of 1837 and 1857 no effect upon the development of party ? Was the sectional conflict of 1846–1861 to be brought to a head by nothing more fundamental than the disease of wounded pride ? Can the irrepressible conflict be disproved by demonstrating that some men are objective, some subjective, while both combine to make up all political parties ? The failure to consult the economic differences of the industrial groups leads to the mechanical interpretation of party which inveighs against independent parties and didactically asserts that there is room in the United States for only two real political parties.

The third work discovers the cause of party organization in numbers and distances instead of in man and his varying needs, hence sees no economic or natural justification for party spirit or party government. His whole scheme rests upon this assumption and stands or falls as the *a priori* premise prevails.

Mr. Macy's book contains twenty-two chapters, seven being devoted to the exposition of the author's point of view, and the remainder to illustrations taken from the period 1846–1861. Unfortunately the philosophy precedes the history, nor does the reader come to feel that the former grew out of the latter. There are evidences of hasty workmanship, of a congestion of generalizations, and a confusion of facts. For example, chapter five proves that antebellum politics was reputable, whereas present politics is, thanks to the spoils system, a dishonorable profession. In the following chapter the author demonstrates that the change is in the moral sense of the community which science has brought to a higher standard. Politics is not more corrupt than before the war, but individual morality has improved. Again, it is said that "an American political party cannot represent a locality nor a class nor any special interest" (p. 167), while elsewhere the spoils system is responsible for having "substituted a faction in place of the older and broader spirit. . . . The party machine now denotes a conspiracy whereby a few corrupt and

designing politicians gain and hold political power for the sake of public plunder" (p. 81).

The author defines party as follows: The party is a useful agency in the development of democracy. It grew out of civil strife as the judicial system grew out of private warfare. Its evils and imperfections are due to growth, not inherent in the system. It is the only effective agency which the people have for making nominations, carrying elections, and translating political conviction into public policy. So far Mr. Clark and Mr. Macy are in full accord, the former saying, "The machinery of our present politics supplies a want: it is more or growth than a device; rather a rally of nature than an exploit of art." The two disagree as to the effect of the spoils system upon party solidarity. Mr. Macy declares that it is a divisive factor while Mr. Clark insists that it is the nurse-bottle of parties.

The former declares that there is room but for two parties; the latter, that there is room for no party although there is need of such party machinery as the caucus, convention, etc. The former insists that attempts to create and maintain a third political party are culpable waste of political energy. The latter insists that attempts to maintain two parties as at present are culpable extravagance, and avers that it is practicable to dispense with all parties and vote for *men*.

It seems somewhat incongruous to learn in a history of slavery in politics that independent political parties are not warranted in our system. The author is, however, perfectly consistent with himself for he believes that the whig party is responsible for the Civil War. The disease being that of wounded pride, there was need, not for new doctors, but for sugar remedies. These the whig party should have administered. Party loyalty and prejudice would have responded to the application of party medicine. The cohesive force of the whig party was stronger than the separating force of incompatible economic interests.

Not more satisfactory and convincing is the argument for the continuance of the bi-party system. If, as the author says, party has grown out of strife, there would seem to be a theoretical presumption in favor of the multiplication of parties in this country. If men strive in politics for the recognition of rights more fundamental than the right to sit in official chairs and plunder the public, the sufficiency of the bi-party system must depend upon the existence of only one grave issue. The author says, page 78: "It is difficult for the student of

present day politics to understand how so many independent political movements coexist as in 1850." Yet in 1900 there were at least three distinct independent political parties representing fundamental economic principles incompatible with those of the dominant parties. In 1892 the two independent parties polled over 1.3 million votes, carried four states, split the electoral vote in two others, and gave Indiana and New York, and the presidency to the democratic party.

The author's criticism of the spoils system is, to say the least, novel. That it is a divisive force is difficult to believe when we recall the effect of the distribution of patronage upon the ascendancy of Tammany in New York City, of the republican state boss, of the city republican administration in Philadelphia, of democracy in Chicago, etc. The present movement to take from large cities their local autonomy, so far as patronage is concerned, represents rather a desire of practical politicians to use spoils as a cohesive cementing force. Is it not more likely that the bi-partisan system persists because of the spoils system rather than in spite of it? Would the spoils system unify French Irreconcilables to one of the probable distributors of the spoils? Mr. Clark's analysis of the present system is as follows. It is the matter of elections alone that connects the people with public authority. This is the shafting to which their intentions are geared at one end and political results at the other. The present actual fact is that, at the dictate of leaders whom we have not chosen, we vote for candidates whom we do not know to discharge duties that we cannot understand. In short our written system of elections has utterly broken down. This is inherent in the system of direct popular election, which necessarily, except in small constituencies, involves three lies: (1) that the elector knows whom he is voting for, (2) that he comprehends what he is voting about, (3) that his vote will have its proper weight without preliminary consultation and arrangement with other voters. Realizing their helplessness in the struggle against the machine, its committees, and its healers, all of whom in their quest for spoils and power, by the aid of a debauched press, disregard the country's needs, the better sort of people are abstaining from politics. The best men are fast disappearing from public life and are leaving the government to young men whose indecency and vulgarity are already reacting to the deterioration of popular morality.

Yet the machine is not all bad. Its organization is more than an accident or a conspiracy. Its aid is invoked by democracy itself as

now constructed. The people can *elect*; they are, however, utterly powerless to *select* public officers. The party primaries and conventions are necessary to the collection of the public will and the concentration of the general voice. Without them the public will must be utterly impotent, and public policy a chaos, in every constituency larger than a town meeting. The evils of the present system grow out of the fact that the people are contented to forego the privilege of selecting officers. They do not realize that election is mere confirmation of the party, not choice of the man. The remedy is an extension of the representative principle in politics. The caucus and convention must be substituted for the polls. The laws must recognize public practice, which already intrusts the choice of rulers to a very few. Since only at primaries can the will of the public be made effective, therefore the law should compel the voter to concentrate his interest in the one actual opportunity to make an intelligent and proper choice.

The voters should be divided into squads or precincts, the number not to exceed two hundred. No voter, unless delegated by his squad, is ever to vote for any candidate outside his squad. So delegates to the county, state, or district conventions hold the suffrage of their respective groups in their hand. Thus is each delegate responsible to a group of two hundred men, every one of whom can and will know him personally. The inevitable effect of this method would be to bring out from each group the most intelligent and reliable man. We should, therefore, have shortly a government by truly representative men, good men, whose official acts would be upright, because reviewable by their intimate associates in citizenship. This concentration in one primary of all one's local, state, and national political interest would necessarily result in a greater deliberation, a wiser choice, a purer vote, and thus effect the ultimate abolishment of the machine, and of party spirit and party rule.

This plan is shown to have been enthusiastically indorsed by eminent men, including Peter Cooper, Samuel J. Bayard, George Alfred Townsend, and editors of various newspapers, such as the *Philadelphia Press*, *New York Evening Post*, the *Nation*, *New York World*, etc. The author submits as the strongest possible testimony of the plan's effectiveness and practicability the fact that all the political machinery of New York state was, in 1892, directed against a proposal to test the plan in Oswego.

The fundamental premises of the plan obviously deny the existence of economic and social reasons for party spirit, party discipline, and political corruption. If "everybody wants good government" (p. 21) why can it not be obtained through the present system, where one may not only go to the primary, but may check the acts of delegates who fail to represent faithfully their group? If to have "good men in office is to have good government" (p. 17), then why cannot voters who recognize this exercise a double control under the present system? If people cannot be made to accept this view of government will the proposed plan prevent party union on the basis of principle of government as at present? If there remains the same demand on the part of certain industries for protection, there is no reason to suppose that protectionists will vote for a good man to execute free-trade laws. So long as the industrial world believes that bimetallism would institute a reign of terror in business, there is every reason to believe that capital will continue to oppose an honest advocate of free coinage. Just so long as the masses express a distrust in the fairness of the distribution of the social surplus and make demands for encroachments upon the earnings of large corporations, we will continue to have the incentive to debauch the suffrage. To the end of time the existence of valuable public privileges will generate a type of manipulator greedy for power in order to secure plunder.

That is to say the plan does not propose to change the nature of man nor that of his social environment. It would leave partisanship, party spirit, party prejudice, and conflicting economic interests, which demand state action or inaction. The author does not show why selfseeking men and interests will not build up a new series of voluntary, extra legal, party caucuses and conventions to arrange for concerted action at the final legal primary. He, like Mr. Macy, underestimates inherent reasons for party action based upon interest rather than tradition. Party caucuses and conventions are used not to enable the American people to live within the law, but rather to enable portions of the people to shape policies of government suited to specific worldly interests. It is highly improbable that the un-American name whig precipitated the secession of South Carolina (Macy, p. 151). It is equally unlikely that the American people are prepared to put good government before government on the right economic principle, or man before policy. If the author is wrong in assuming that there is no reason for party action on national issues, his system

must fail, because the machinery and the morality of national, state, and local politics must rise and fall together.

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Dennoch! Aus Theorie und Geschichte der gewerkschaftlichen Arbeiterbewegung. Von WERNER SOMBART, Professor an der Universität Breslau. Jena : Gustav Fischer, 1900. 8vo, pp. 121.

IN the preface Professor Sombart explains that his lectures were prepared for a general audience, and contain nothing new in theory. The principal topics are the origin and purpose of the trade union movement, the English trade unions, the German labor movement, a valuation of the nature and mission of the associations of workmen, and some incidents of recent controversies. The closing quotations from partisan newspapers illustrate the fact that an academic lecturer who seeks to be impartial in public debate is apt to draw fire from both contending armies. In this particular instance the professor really seems to enjoy the epithets which are shot at him.

One of the most interesting and fresh discussions of the book is the author's description of the trade union guild-house at Berlin.

C. R. HENDERSON.